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PRELIMINARY DRAFT – COMMENTS APPRECIATED
Easy on the SALT
A Qualified Defense of the Deduction for State and Local Taxes
Daniel Hemel*
DRAFT — Oct. 28, 2017
Congressional Republicans and Trump administration officials have said
that they plan to repeal the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes (SALT)
as part of a comprehensive tax reform package. This essay critically examines the
major arguments for repealing the SALT deduction. Repealing the deduction and
using the resulting revenues to reduce federal rates across the board would likely
lead to greater tax-induced deadweight loss overall. Repealing the deduction also
would distort decisions about the financing of education and health care, which
together account for more than half of all state and local government spending.
Repeal would further encourage a shift from nonbusiness to business taxes at the
state and local level, and potentially would result in more borrowing by subnational
governments in the short and medium term. It would have ambiguous effects on the
progressivity of the overall tax system, and it would exacerbate existing differences
in federal tax burdens across states. The essay concludes that the case against the
SALT deduction fails on its own terms, and that the status quo of partial
deductibility offers a number of underappreciated advantages vis-à-vis the
alternative of full repeal.
The state and local tax deduction is in danger. House Speaker Paul Ryan’s June 2016
blueprint for tax reform proposed to eliminate it.1 Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in April
2017 that the Trump administration wanted to dump the deduction too.2 The “Unified Framework”
for tax reform published by the White House and congressional leaders in late September 2017
implicitly calls for repeal of the deduction by leaving it off the list of itemized deductions that
would be retained.3 The state and local tax deduction—included in every version of the federal
income tax since the Civil War—may finally be on its way out.
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; dhemel@uchicago.edu. The
author thanks Thomas Brennan, Shu-Yi Oei, James Repetti, Diane Ring, Victor Thuronyi, and
participants in the Boston College Tax Policy Workshop for thoughtful comments on an earlier
draft.
1
See Paul Ryan et al., A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America—Tax 20 (2016) (“To
simplify tax filings further for middle-income families, this Blueprint reflects the elimination of
all itemized deductions except the mortgage interest deduction and the charitable contribution
deduction.”).
2
See Jennifer McLoughlin, Trump’s Tax Plan Dumps State, Local Tax Deduction, Bloomberg
BNA Daily Tax Report (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trumps-tax-plan-n57982087246.
3
Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/27/unified-framework-fixing-our-brokentax-code.
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Opponents of the state and local tax (SALT) deduction make five main arguments against
it. First, the deduction narrows the federal tax base, meaning that Congress must impose higher
marginal tax rates (leading to larger deadweight losses) in order to meet its revenue goals.4 Second,
the deduction reduces the after-tax price of goods and services supplied by states and localities
relative to goods and services supplied through the market, thus leading to overprovision of goods
and services by subnational government.5 Third, the deductibility of some but not all payments to
states and localities distorts those governments’ choices among tax instruments.6 Fourth, the
deduction disproportionately benefits high-income households and so makes the overall tax system
more regressive.7 Fifth, the deduction leads to inequities across jurisdictions, with low-tax states
effectively subsidizing higher-tax states.8

4

See, e.g., Rachel Greszler & Kevin D. Dayaratna, Time to End the Federal Subsidy for HighTax States, Heritage Found.: Backgrounder, No. 2999, at 2, 4-5 (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/BG2999.pdf; Jeremy Horpedahl & Harrison
Searles, The Deduction of State and Local Taxes from Federal Income Taxes 3 (Mercatus Ctr. at
George Mason Univ., Mercatus on Policy, Mar. 2014),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Horpedahl_State-Deductions_MOP_030614.pdf; Jason
Pye, Tax Reform Should End the Deduction for State and Local Taxes to Finance Lower Tax
Rates, FreedomWorks (May 9, 2017), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/tax-reform-shouldend-deduction-state-and-local-taxes-finance-lower-tax-rates.
5
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
under the Federal Income Tax, 82 Va. L. Rev. 413, 489 (1996) (“[W]hen taxes are deductible,
residents do not bear the full cost of their jurisdiction’s public goods and services. As a result,
residents will tend to favor greater public provision than otherwise . . . . If provision would
otherwise be undistorted, the result might involve excessive provision of some goods and
services and inefficient production of others . . . .”); Frank Sammartino and Kim Rueben,
Revisiting the State and Local Tax Deduction, Tax Policy Ctr. 7 (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2000693-revisiting-the-state-and-local-tax-deduction.pdf
(stating that the SALT deduction can “distort choices about the level of subnational government
spending”).
6
See, e.g., Sammartino & Rueben, supra note 5, at 7 (“The deduction may encourage states to
adopt a less economically efficient mix of taxes, relying more heavily on deductible taxes than
on nondeductible user fees.”).
7
See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Tilts in the Tax Code: Pictures of Regressive Deductions, Wash.
Post, July 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/30/tilts-inthetax-code-pictures-of-regressive-deductions (describing SALT deduction as “regressive”); Ben
Casselman, The Tax Deductions Economists Hate, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 3, 2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-tax-deductions-economists-hate (“The deduction for state
and local taxes helps the rich even more than the mortgage-interest deduction.”); The Blue Tax,
Nat’l Rev., Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/335632/blue-tax-editors
(SALT deduction is a “regressive subsidy”).
8
See, e.g., Greszler & Dayaratna, supra note 4, at 2-3; Jared Walczak, The State and Local Tax
Deduction: A Primer, Tax Found., Fiscal Fact No. 545, at 6 (Mar. 2017),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170315142330/Tax-Foundation-FF545.pdf (“Just as the state
2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061096
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All of these arguments are faulty. Repealing the deduction to finance an across-the-board
rate cut would raise the combined (federal plus state) marginal rate for households in high-tax
states and reduce the combined marginal rate for households in low-tax states; basic principles of
public economics suggest that the net effect of these two changes on the supply of labor and capital
is likely to be negative. As for the charge that the deduction distorts decisions about the provision
of public goods and the financing of subnational government: repealing the deduction would
remove some of these distortions but introduce several others. Finally, repealing the deduction
would have ambiguous effects on both progressivity and interstate equity.
The literature on the SALT deduction is extensive.9 This essay does not seek to recapitulate
all of the arguments that have been made in favor of the deduction and against. Instead, it
emphasizes a number of new or underappreciated points that are relevant to the repeal proposals
emerging from the Republican leadership. Among others:
— While the “broad base rule,” which recommends lower rates on a broader base to
minimize the deadweight loss of taxation, is sometimes invoked as a reason for repealing
the SALT deduction, the intuition underlying the broad base rule may actually weigh in
the SALT deduction’s favor;
— Insofar as state and local tax taxes fund educational expenditures (the number one
category of state and local government spending), full deductibility is appropriate under
the consumption tax principles animating the Unified Framework;
— Insofar as state and local tax taxes fund health care expenditures (the number two
category of state and local government spending), full deductibility is necessary to ensure
equal treatment of employer-provided and subnational government-provided health care;
— Repealing the SALT deduction while retaining the charitable contribution deduction—
which is what the Unified Framework proposes to do—would distort collective decisions
regarding the financing of public goods;
— Repealing the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes while retaining the
deduction for taxes paid by businesses—which is also what the Unified Framework
apparently proposes—would introduce new distortions into the choice of revenue-raising
instruments for state and local governments;
and local tax deduction disproportionately favors wealthier taxpayers, it also benefits states
which combine high incomes and high-tax environments.”).
9
Significant contributions in the law review literature include Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to
State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 805 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes under the Federal Income Tax, 82 Va. L. Rev. 413 (1996); and Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal
Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local
Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1389 (2004).

3
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— Repealing the SALT deduction would potentially lead to an increase in state and local
government borrowing unless Congress could credibly commit not to revive the
deduction down the road;
— Notwithstanding the fact that the benefits of the SALT deduction accrue
disproportionately to high-income households, repeal of the SALT deduction in the
service of across-the-board rate cuts would potentially make the federal tax system less
progressive in important respects; and
— While interstate equity is a dubious objective for federal tax policy in the first place,
those who believe that the federal government should seek to allocate the burdens and
benefits of federal taxing and spending evenly across states ought to support—not
oppose—the SALT deduction on those grounds.
Part I provides a brief overview of the SALT deduction and the debate surrounding it. Part
II considers the deduction’s effect on labor supply, capital investment, and overall economic
growth. Part III evaluates the effects of the deduction on the revenue-raising and spending
decisions of state and local governments. Part IV takes up equity-related arguments for and against
the deduction. Part V concludes.
I. The SALT Deduction: An Overview
A. Evolution of the Deduction
The deductibility of state and local taxes has been a feature of the federal income tax
throughout its history. The first federal income tax statute, the Revenue Act of 1861, allowed a
deduction for “all national, state, or local taxes assessed upon property, from which income is
derived,”10 and Congress extended the deduction to nonbusiness state and local taxes four years
later.11 When the federal income tax was resurrected briefly in 1894, the deduction for all state and
local taxes was revived as well.12 The deduction reemerged in the Revenue Act of 1913, the first
federal income tax statute enacted after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.13 It has remained
ever since, though with several notable modifications and fluctuations.14
First, while the deductibility of state and local income as well as real and personal property
taxes has been a constant, the deductibility of state and local sales taxes has not been. The Revenue
10

See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. The Revenue Act of 1861 never went into
effect, but the Revenue Act of 1862, which did take effect, included a nearly identical provision.
See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 91, 12 Stat. 473-74.
11
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 479. On the early history of the SALT deduction, see
William J. Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax—The Ideal, 66 Cornell L.
Rev. 262, 264-66 (1981).
12
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553.
13
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167.
14
See Turnier, supra note 11, at 267-69.
4
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Act of 1964 limited the sales tax deduction to taxes on general sales, gasoline, and motor fuel, thus
disallowing deductions for taxes on motor vehicle licenses, alcohol, and cigarettes (among
others).15 The Revenue Act of 1978 eliminated the deduction for state and local taxes on gasoline
and motor vehicle fuel,16 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dispensed with the deduction for sales
taxes entirely.17 From then until 2004, the status quo was that nonbusiness state and local income
and property taxes were deductible, while nonbusiness sales taxes were not.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 changed the SALT status quo in one important
way: it gave taxpayers the opportunity to deduct state and local income taxes or state and local
sales taxes (but not both).18 The 2004 law also instructed the IRS to prescribe tables that allow
taxpayers to estimate their state and local sales taxes based on their adjusted gross income, filing
status, number of dependents, and the general sales tax rates in their state and locality.19 Though
the option to deduct state and local sales taxes was initially enacted as a temporary measure and
set to expire at the end of 2005,20 Congress has extended the option ever since, finally making it
permanent at the end of 2015.21
Significantly, the treatment of sales taxes under section 164 means that taxpayers cannot
deduct all state and local taxes paid. Thirty-nine states impose taxes on both income and general
sales, meaning that taxpayers will lose the ability to deduct one or the other. The only exceptions
are Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, which have income taxes but not general
sales taxes; Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming, which have
general sales taxes but not income taxes; and Alaska, which has neither an income tax nor a general
sales tax (though some localities impose sales taxes of their own).22 Yet all of those states have
selective sales taxes of some sort for which no deduction is allowed (e.g., taxes on alcoholic
beverages, amusements, gambling, insurance premiums, motor fuels, tobacco, and utilities).23
Thus, there is no state in which taxpayers have the option to deduct all state and local taxes paid.
Beyond the introduction of the option to deduct state and local sales taxes, three other
changes affecting the SALT deduction merit mention. One is the advent of the standard

15

Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 207, 78 Stat. 40; see Turnier, supra note 11, at 268 & n.31.
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § __, 92 Stat. __.
17
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § __, 100 Stat. __.
18
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § __, 118 Stat. __ (codified at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)).
19
Id. § __, 100 Stat. __ (codified at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)(H)).
20
Id. § __, 100 Stat. __.
21
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § __, __ Stat. __.
22
See Julie Garber, State Tax Chart, The Balance (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.thebalance.com/state-tax-chart-3505461 New Hampshire’s income tax applies only
to interest and dividends, not to salaries and wages. Tennessee also has an income tax that
applies only to interest and dividends.
23
U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections Detailed
Table (May 12, 2017), https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax.
16
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deduction—initially introduced in 1944.24 The fraction of taxpayers claiming the standard
deduction has fluctuated over time—in tax year 2014, the most recent year for which
comprehensive data are available, 69.0% of individual income tax returns claimed the standard
deduction.25 Since the SALT deduction is available only to itemizers, this means that less than
one-third of individuals filing federal income tax returns claim any deduction for nonbusiness state
and local taxes.
A second significant development is the advent of the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
Introduced in 1969, the AMT has become an increasingly important element of the federal tax
system over time. The percentage of tax returns showing liability under the AMT has climbed
from around 0.1% in 1990 to nearly 2.9% in 2014 (the most recent year for which data is
available).26 The primary effect of the AMT on taxpayers who are subject to it is to reduce the
value of the SALT deduction. Note that the AMT does not eliminate the value of the SALT
deduction for taxpayers who are subject to it, even though state and local taxes are not deductible
for AMT purposes. This is because taxpayers who are subject to the AMT still generally pay less
than they would have if their liabilities had been calculated under the normal tax without a SALT
deduction. For these taxpayers, the AMT diminishes the value of the SALT deduction—but not all
the way down to zero.27
A third development is the introduction and resurrection of the Pease provision, which was
in effect from 1991 through 2009 and has been in place from 2013 to the present. The Pease
provision, also known as the overall limitation on itemized deductions, drives a wedge between
the marginal rate and the rate at which deductions can be taken for taxpayers with adjusted gross
income above a certain threshold ($261,500 in 2017 for single taxpayers, $313,800 for married

24

On the history of the standard deduction, see John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The
Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 Colum. J. Tax
Law 203, 209-18 (2011).
25
Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income Div., Publication 1304 tbl.1.3 (Aug. 2016).
26
Id.
27
To illustrate (using a publicly available tax return as an example): Tim Kaine and Anne Holton
reported taxable income of $253,901 in 2014—including a $21,567 deduction for state and local
taxes in that calculation. Their liability under the normal tax would have been $59,409; their
tentative minimum tax for AMT purposes was $63,606; and so they paid the latter (larger)
amount. But while the SALT deduction played no role in the calculation of their $63,606 liability
under the AMT, they nonetheless received a benefit from the SALT deduction. That is because
in the absence of the SALT deduction, their taxable income would have been $275,468, and their
liability under the normal tax would have been $66,807. Another way of thinking about this is
that while they would have received a SALT deduction worth $7,147 (33% times $21,657) under
normal tax principles, while instead they received a benefit worth $3,201 (the difference between
their liability under normal tax principles and under the AMT). That is, the AMT reduced the
value of the SALT deduction to the Kaines by roughly 55%, not by 100%. See Tax Analysts,
Tax History Project: Presidential Tax Returns
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/web/presidentialtaxreturns (last visited Aug. 30,
2017) (follow link for Vice Presidential Candidate Tim Kaine’s 2014 return).
6
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couples filing jointly).28 For taxpayers in the highest bracket, the effect is to increase the top
marginal rate from 39.6% to 40.8% while still allowing deductions only at the lower 39.6% rate.
This 1.2 percentage point increase is on top of Medicare taxes, which raise the top marginal rate
for high-income households by as much as 3.8 percentage points to 44.6% without affecting the
rate at which deductions can be taken.29 The Pease provision and Medicare taxes have the effect
of limiting the SALT deduction for top-bracket taxpayers to approximately 89 cents for every $1
of deductible state and local taxes paid (39.6%/44.6% ≈ 0.89).
These limits on the value of the SALT deduction matter for purposes of the present debate
because they reduce the justificatory burden for SALT deduction defenders. That is, defenders of
the SALT status quo must explain why a partial deduction for state and local taxes is appropriate—
but need not explain why a full deduction would be appropriate because full deductibility is not
the status quo. To be sure, one might accept the argument for partial deductibility but argue that
the current rate of deductibility is too high (or too low). The central claim here is that a rule of zero
deductibility is normatively undesirable, though I am much less confident that the current
patchwork of limits on the value of the SALT deduction gets the rate of deductibility just right.
B. The State of the Debate
Much of the debate over the SALT deduction so far has focused on the question of
horizontal equity. To concretize the question: Imagine that State X imposes a 10% income tax and
State Y imposes no income tax. Imagine, moreover, that Worker A in State X earns 100, while
Worker B in State Y earns 100 and Worker C in State Y earns 90. If we want the federal tax system
to treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly, does that mean Worker A should pay the same
amount in federal taxes are Worker B (no SALT deduction), the same amount as Worker C (full
deduction), or less than Worker B but more than Worker C (the partial deductibility status quo)?
The horizontal equity debate has gone on for decades without reaching a clear resolution.
Three observations stand out. First, at least with respect to the deduction for state and local income
taxes, the answer to the deductibility question matters little for horizontal equity among workers
if labor is fully mobile. To see why, imagine a federal tax rate of 40% and a Worker W who can
earn 100 pre-tax (60 after taxes) by working for a firm in tax-free State Y. Assume, moreover, that
there is no difference in amenity levels between State X and State Y but that State X imposes a
10% tax.30 For a firm in State X to lure Worker W, it must offer him a wage such that he ends up
28

See I.R.C. § 68.
See I.R.C. §§ 1411, 3101, 3111.
30
Adding in amenity level differences complicates the arithmetic but does not alter the result. To
illustrate: Assume that taxes in State X finance amenities that Worker W values at 5. For worker
W to be indifferent between the job in State X and the job in State Y, the offer from the firm in
State X must leave him with 55 on an after-tax basis (plus untaxed amenities worth 5 equals 60).
With no SALT deduction, the offer must be at least 110, in which case Worker W will pay 11 in
state taxes and 44 in federal taxes, leaving him with 55 on an after-tax basis. With a SALT
deduction, the offer must be at least 101.85, in which case Worker W will pay 10.19 in state
taxes and 36.67 in federal taxes, leaving him with 55 (rounded) on an after-tax basis (plus
untaxed amenities worth 5 equals 60). The key point is that insofar as State X offers amenities
29
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at least as well off as in State Y (60 after taxes). With no SALT deduction, the offer must be at
least 120, in which case Worker W will pay 12 in State X taxes and 48 in federal taxes, ending up
with 60 on an after-tax basis. With a SALT deduction, the offer must be at least 111.11, in which
case Worker W will pay 11.11 in State X taxes and 40 in federal taxes, ending up with 60 on an
after-tax basis. Worker W is essentially indifferent as to whether there is or is not a SALT
deduction: he ends up with 60 after taxes either way, and the SALT deduction only affects the cost
to his employer.
To be sure, even with (indeed, especially with) full labor mobility, the SALT deduction
affects the relative wealth of employers in State X and State Y. Firms in high-tax states benefit if
the deduction is preserved; firms in low-tax states benefit if the deduction is repealed (assuming
that the resulting revenues are used to cut federal rates across the board). However, horizontal
equity supplies neither an argument for deductibility nor against: the principle of horizontal equity
tells us that if two individuals are similarly situated pre-tax, then we should tax the two of them
similarly as well, but a taxpayer’s pre-tax economic situation is itself endogenous to whether we
allow a SALT deduction. A similar argument applies with respect to the deduction for property
taxes: turning on or off the SALT deduction for property taxes affects prices of owner-occupied
residential real estate in State X and State Y, but that difference is likely to be reflected in house
prices. Horizontal equity does not supply a reason for favoring one policy over the other.31
Second, if labor is immobile, then deductibility potentially affects horizontal equity among
workers but not in a way that yields clear policy implications. Imagine that State X and State Y
impose no income tax, that Worker A in State X and Worker B in State Y each earn 100, and that
State X then imposes a tax of t that funds amenities per capita of a. Worker A may now be worse
off than Worker B (if the value of a < t) or may be better off than Worker B (if the value of a > t).
Because of labor immobility, wages do not adjust to restore equality between Worker A and
Worker B.

that State Y does not, those amenity differences will be reflected in wage differences when labor
is fully mobile.
31
See Kaplow, supra note 5, at 454-56. To illustrate: Imagine two homes, one in State X and the
other in State Y, both of which cost 100 in a tax-free world. Assume a risk-free rate of return of
10% and that real estate is a risk-free asset. The user cost of living in either house is 10 per year
(equal to the opportunity cost of capital, or the rate of return times the home price). Now imagine
that State X levies a property tax of 1 per year and State Y levies no property tax. Assume that the
federal tax rate is 40%, that there is no deduction for state and local property taxes, and that there
is no amenity-level difference resulting from the new tax. For a potential homeowner to be
indifferent between the house in State X and the house in State Y, the price on the house in State
X must fall from 100 to 90 (in which case the user cost of living in the State X house, 1 in property
taxes plus a capital cost of 9, will equal the user cost of living in the State Y house). With a
deduction for state and local property taxes, the after-federal-tax cost of the property tax bill on
the house in State X falls from 1 to 0.6, and the potential homeowner is indifferent between a house
priced at 94 in State X and a house priced at 100 in State Y (in which case the user cost of living
in the State X house, 0.6 in tax-related costs plus a capital cost of 9.4, will equal the user cost of
living in the State Y house).
8
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As a thought experiment, Louis Kaplow more than two decades ago proposed allowing a
deduction for state and local taxes but then adding back to taxable income some estimate of a (i.e.,
the value of amenities provided by subnational government).32 Assuming that state and local taxes
paid exceed amenities for high-income households, such a scheme would look something like
partial deductibility—which is the de facto regime for high-income households under the status
quo. Arguably, lower-income households (for whom amenities more likely exceed state and local
taxes paid) are being undertaxed under the status quo: while most lower-income households do
not itemize and therefore claim no deduction for state and local income taxes, Kaplow’s proposal
might suggest that these households should bear a positive tax liability if on net they receive more
from states and localities than they pay. Note, though, that if we think of intrajurisdictional
transfers between net payors and net recipients as gifts mediated through state and local
governments, then deduction for net payors and inclusion for net recipients would be inconsistent
with the income tax’s general treatment of gifts—which are neither deductible to the giver nor
included in the income of the giftee. (This point is considered at greater length in Section II.B.)
Third, underlying the horizontal equity debate over the SALT deduction is the question of
why we care about horizontal equity in the first place. A plausible view is that our worry about
horizontal equity is derivative of our concern about vertical equity.33 An additional dollar delivers
greater utility to a poor person than to a rich one, and so transferring the dollar from the rich person
to the poor person increases total welfare. Likewise, if two individuals have the same income (and,
by hypothesis, the same marginal utility of income), then welfare is maximized by taxing the two
of them the same. Put differently: If A and B have the same pre-tax income but A pays more in
taxes, and the marginal utility of income is diminishing over income, then A’s marginal utility of
income is greater than B’s; welfare can be enhanced by transferring dollars from B to A—which
is to say, by shifting a portion of the tax burden from A to B. To decide who should be a transferor
and who should be a transferee, we need a reasonably accurate measure of each individual’s
marginal utility of income. The Internal Revenue Code’s system of inclusions, exclusions,
deductions, and exemptions aims to do just that.
A focus on the marginal utility of income changes the terms of the debate over the SALT
deduction. The question becomes not whether Worker A in State X who earns income of i, pays
states taxes of t, and receives amenities of a is better off or worse off than Worker B in State Y
who earns income of i, pays no state taxes, and receives no amenities. Rather, the question becomes
whether Worker A in State X who earns income of i, pays state taxes of t, and receives amenities
of a has a higher or lower marginal utility of income than Worker B in State Y who earns income
of i, pays no state taxes, and receives no amenities. The answers to these two questions may differ
because not all increases to utility diminish the marginal utility of income. Amenities provided by
subnational governments may be substitutes for market consumption (in which case we might
think that the marginal utility of income decreases over a) or may be complements to market
consumption (in which case we might think that the marginal utility of income increases over a).

32

See id. at 423-30.
See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat’l Tax J. 139
(1989).
33
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Consider, for example, the provision of police services. Arguably, police services function
as a substitute for private security services that taxpayers would otherwise pay for out of pocket;
taxpayers in jurisdictions with high-quality public policing therefore may have more disposable
income available for (non-security) consumption, and so a lower marginal utility of income. But
police services also can be complements to consumption insofar as they increase the value to
individuals of market-purchased goods. A taxpayer might be more inclined to buy, say, a fancy
sports car if the risk of theft or vandalism is low. Effective policing may expand and enrich the
taxpayer’s menu of consumption possibilities, thus raising the marginal utility of income.34 From
a welfarist perspective, the decision whether to allow a deduction for state and local taxes arguably
depends not only on whether amenities (a) are greater than, equal to, or less than state and local
taxes paid (t), but also on whether those amenities are substitutes for or complements to other
goods and services.
The takeaway from this discussion is that even if labor is immobile, and even if the value
of amenities provided by subnational government can be quantified, horizontal equity principles
do not yield concrete implications for the deductibility of state and local taxes. Normative
evaluations of the SALT deduction likely must rest on other bases. Parts II and III consider
efficiency-related arguments for and against the deduction; Part IV turns to arguments based on
principles of vertical equity and equity across states.
II. Broadening the Base To Lower Rates?
One motivation for repeal of the SALT deduction is base-broadening. As the House
Republicans’ blueprint emphasizes, “carve-outs reduce tax revenue,” which, “in turn, typically
requires increases in marginal rates to make up for lost revenue.”35 When marginal rates are higher,
individuals are more likely to choose leisure over labor and less likely to make new investments.
On this view, repealing the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenue to lower marginal
rates would unleash economic growth. I will refer to this argument as the base-broadening
argument.
The problem with the base-broadening argument as applied to the SALT deduction is that
the deduction itself affects the combined federal-plus-state marginal tax rate on labor and capital
income for the households that claim it. Repealing the SALT deduction and using the resulting
revenues to reduce federal tax rates across the board will lower the combined federal-plus-state
34

This point is related to—though not quite the same as—the classic Corlett-Hague tax rule,
which holds that complements to labor should be taxed at a lower rate than complements to
leisure. See W.J. Corlett & D.C. Hague, Complementarity and the Excess Burden, 21 Rev. Econ.
Studs. 21 (1953). Some goods and services provided by state and local governments are labor
complements (e.g., job training and commuter bus and rail lines); others are leisure complements
(e.g., public parks). The Corlett-Hague rule may yield the recommendation that expenditures on
state and local government be treated differently than other expenditures (either taxed at a lower
rate if state and local taxes primarily fund the provision of labor complements, or taxed at a
higher rate if state and local taxes primarily fund leisure complements). I will defer discussion of
the actual uses of state and local tax dollars to Section III.1.
35
Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 32.
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marginal rate for households in low-tax states while raising the combined federal-plus-state
marginal rate for households in high-tax states. The likely net effect is to increase the total
deadweight loss of taxation—contrary to the objective behind base-broadening.
In an Appendix, I present a rudimentary model that illustrates the point more formally. I
assume that labor supply is unit elastic and that the burden of taxation falls entirely on labor (which
is assumed to be immobile). The model involves two states with equal populations: one state (State
X) that imposes a 10% income tax, and another state (State Y) that imposes no income tax. The
federal tax rate is 40% with a SALT deduction, meaning that the combined federal-plus-state
marginal rate in State X is 46% (i.e., 40% federal plus 10% state minus 4% for the SALT
deduction) and the combined rate in State Y is 40% (i.e., 40% federal with no state addition).
Under these conditions, I show that repealing the SALT deduction reduces total labor output by
approximately 0.56% and increases deadweight loss by approximately 2.31%.
This basic result holds so long as the price elasticity of labor supply in high-tax states is
roughly equal to the price elasticity of labor supply in low-tax states. It is concededly possible that
tax-insensitive individuals migrate to high-tax states (State X in the running example) while taxsensitive individuals sort to low-tax states (State Y), in which case cuts in the effective tax rate in
State Y may do more to spur labor output than tax hikes in State X would do to dampen. The
burden on those advancing the base-broadening argument for SALT repeal is to show that the
difference in elasticities is sufficient to justify an intervention that would widen the gap between
effective rates in high-tax and low-tax states. Until then, the base-broadening argument for SALT
repeal should be considered questionable at best.
The same analysis that applies to the deduction for state and local income taxes also applies
to the deduction for state and local sales taxes, because the sales tax deduction—as implemented—
is based on income.36 There is, however, one significant category of state and local taxes to which
the base-broadening argument for SALT repeal does apply: state and local property taxes on
owner-occupied homes. The deduction for state and local property taxes does not reduce the
combined federal-plus-state marginal rate on labor or capital income for any taxpayer, and so
repealing the deduction for property taxes and using the revenue to reduce marginal rates across
the board would be consistent with the intuition underlying prescriptions for base-broadening, ratelowering tax reform.
Note, though, that the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied
homes accounts for less than one-third of the federal tax expenditure associated with the SALT
deduction.37 Insofar as the base-broadening argument supports SALT repeal at all, it would support

36

Taxpayers who claim the itemized deduction for sales taxes generally use a calculator that
estimates their sales taxes paid based on location, income, and household size. See Internal
Revenue Serv., Sales Tax Deduction Calculator, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/sales-taxdeduction-calculator (last updated Nov. 28, 2016).
37
The Joint Committee on Taxation’s expenditure estimate for the deduction for state and local
real property taxes is $36.4 billion for fiscal year 2018; the expenditure estimate for the
deduction of other nonbusiness state and local government taxes is $74.1 billion. Staff of the J.
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only the repeal of the deduction for state and local property taxes. And even that step—repeal of
the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes—would seem to be in
tension with the reasoning of the Unified Framework. While recommending the repeal of other
itemized deductions, the Unified Framework would retain the home mortgage interest deduction
on the view that the deduction promotes homeownership, which in turn “strengthen[s] civil
society.”38 But the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes promotes
homeownership as well—and unlike the home mortgage interest deduction, which delivers a larger
benefits to recent homebuyers who still have large mortgage loan balances, the deduction for state
and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes rewards households who remain a stable
presence in their communities. Preserving the mortgage interest deduction while repealing the
deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes reflects an incoherent
approach to the promoting the positive externalities (arguably39) associated with homeownership.
III. Efficiency of State and Local Government Decisionmaking
A second set of arguments for repeal of the SALT deduction focuses on the effect of the
deduction on state and local government decisionmaking. Opponents of the deduction claim that
(a) the deduction reduces the after-tax cost of goods and services provided by state and local
governments relative to goods and services provided through market mechanisms, leading to
excessive and inefficient provision of goods and services by states and localities; and (b) the
deductibility of some but not all payments to subnational governments distorts the choice of
revenue-raising instruments by states and localities. At least in the context of other features of the
House Republicans’ blueprint, neither argument provides a persuasive reason for repealing the
deduction.
A. Effect on the Provision of Goods and Services
Consider first the claim that the SALT deduction leads to excessive and inefficient
provision of goods and services and by states and localities. This section highlights two problems
with that argument: (1) well over half of state and local government spending goes toward
education and health care, and the deductibility of those expenditures is (at least arguably)
consistent with the principles underlying the Unified Framework; and (2) deductibility for
charitable contributions but not state and local taxes would (further) distort the choice between the
nonprofit sector and subnational government as provider of public goods and services.
1. Deductions for What?
More than one-third of state and local government spending goes toward education
(elementary, secondary, and higher), and the next largest spending category is health care (through
Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016-2020, at 32,
40 tbl.1 (Jan. 30, 2017).
38
Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 4.
39
On the potential positive and negative externalities associated with homeownership, see
generally Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 17 Tax Policy and the Economy 37 (2003).
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Medicaid/the Children’s Health Insurance Program and otherwise).40 (For a more detailed
breakdown, see Table 1.) These two categories together account for more than half of all state and
local spending.41 The question of whether state and local taxes should be deductible thus largely
comes down to the questions of (i) whether expenditures on education should be deductible and
(ii) whether expenditures on health care should be deductible.
The answers to those questions depend, in part, on whether the relevant tax is an income
tax or a consumption tax. Under an income tax, investments in human capital—like investments
in physical capital—should arguably be capitalized and then amortized over their useful lives. The
useful life of a high school or college degree might approximate the working life of the degree
holder. This might suggest that taxpayers should be able to deduct a portion of the cost of their
education each year. Immediate deduction for educational expenditures, however, would seem to
be inconsistent with the capitalization-and-amortization principle underlying the income tax.42 Yet
the Unified Framework departs from income tax principles by allowing businesses to claim an
immediate deduction for capital expenditures (at least for the next five years).43 This would
transform the income tax into a consumption tax: a tax on income minus savings/investment. Parity
between the tax treatment of physical capital and the tax treatment of human capital would then
require an immediate deduction for educational expenditures (i.e., investments in human capital
assets).

40

See also Urban Inst., State and Local Expenditures, http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/crosscenter-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-andlocal-expenditures (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). The Urban Institute statistics split health care
spending across the “public welfare” and “health and hospitals” category, with most Medicaid
spending placed in the former category.
41
See id.; see also Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access
Comm’n, https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets (last visited Aug.
29, 2017) (showing that more than half of all state spending in fiscal year 2015 went toward
Medicaid and education).
42
See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1477, 1491,
1500-01 (1994); Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1981, 2018-19
(2015).
43
See Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 7.
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Table 1. State and Local Government Expenditures by Category, 2013-201444
Category
Percentage of Direct General Expenditures
(excluding general administration and
interest)
Education
36.6%
Elementary and Secondary
23.7%
Higher Education
10.9%
Other Education
2.0%
Public Welfare Vendor Payments (including
17.8%
Medicaid/CHIP)
Health and Hospitals
10.3%
Public Safety
9.5%
Police
4.1%
Fire
1.8%
Corrections
3.0%
Other Public Safety
0.6%
Transportation
7.8%
Highways
3.5%
Airports
0.9%
Other Transportation
3.4%
Sewage and Solid Waste Management
3.0%
Housing and Community Development
2.0%
Parks and Recreation
1.5%
Other
11.5%
The fact that the taxpayers claiming the SALT deduction are not always the same people
as the students acquiring the relevant human capital does not change matters. Under the Unified
Framework, A could claim an immediate deduction for a capital expenditure and then transfer the
capital asset to B, who would be taxed on income generated by the asset. Analogously, public
financing of elementary, secondary, and higher education involves a large number of As (i.e.,
taxpayers) investing in the development of human capital, claiming immediate deductions, and
transferring that human capital to a large number of Bs (i.e., public school and university students),
who are then taxed on the resulting income (wages). State and local governments mediate
thousands or (in some cases) millions of such transfers.45

44

U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances, Table 1.
State and Local Government Finances by Level of Government and by State: 2013-14 (Dec. 7,
2016).
45
Each of these transfers would presumably fall below the $14,000-per-year threshold for the
taxation of gifts. While many households pay more than $14,000 per year in state and local
taxes, it is doubtful that they pay more than $14,000 per year per beneficiary.
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One response to this line of argument is that education—or, at least, higher education—
“produces utility beyond an increase in future wages”46 (e.g., the joy of learning, campus social
life, and lifelong friendships). Insofar as that is the case, then an immediate and full deduction for
educational expenditures might not be appropriate under consumption tax principles. It is,
however, often the case that capital expenditures will yield some collateral consumption benefit
(e.g., the CEO may derive aesthetic pleasure from a refurbished corporate headquarters). These
collateral consumption benefits might be a reason to limit deductibility through mechanisms such
as the Pease provision and the AMT; they provide a weak basis for repealing the SALT deduction
entirely.
The appropriate treatment of health care expenditures under a consumption tax is
somewhat less certain than the appropriate treatment of educational expenditures. Insofar as good
health enhances productivity, immediate deduction is consistent with consumption tax principles.
The characterization of health care expenditures as productivity-enhancing investments is less
compelling with respect to patients who are beyond working age, but states and localities play a
secondary role to the federal Medicare program in funding health care for retirees.
Analysis of the SALT deduction as applied to health care spending by subnational
governments also requires consideration of the treatment of health care spending elsewhere in the
Internal Revenue Code. Most significantly, the exclusion of employer-provided health care is the
largest single federal tax expenditure, amounting to approximately $173 billion for fiscal year 2018
(i.e., $62 billion more than the expenditure associated with the SALT deduction).47 The House
Republicans’ blueprint would preserve that expenditure: while stating that taxpayers “generally”
should “include in income any compensation received related to employment or selfemployment,” the blueprint prioritizes “quality health care” as one of “[t]wo pressing national
priorities” that “require exceptions to this general rule.”48 (The other is retirement security.) The
Unified Framework does not directly address the exclusion of employer-sponsored health
insurance, but there is no indication that the drafters foresee a change to the status quo treatment.
Insofar as subnational government revenues go toward health care expenditures,
deductibility for state and local taxes establishes parity between the tax treatment of health care
spending by states and localities, on the one hand, and the treatment of health care spending by
employers, on the other. In both cases, the expenditure is deductible to the payor (i.e., the taxpayer
or employer) and excluded from the income of the payee. Again, this is consistent with the
characterization of health care spending as a human capital investment and the treatment of other
capital expenditures under a consumption tax regime.
To be sure, the argument that educational and health care expenditures should be deductible
under a consumption tax only gets us a little more than halfway toward justifying the SALT
deduction under consumption tax principles because educational and health care expenditures
account for only a little more than half of all state and local government spending. The largest
46

Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs—Or Why Costs of Higher
Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 Ohio St. L. J. 927, 939 (1993).
47
See Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation, supra note 37, at 37 tbl.1.
48
See Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 28.
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remaining categories include public safety (9.5%) and transportation (7.8%). As for expenditures
on police and corrections, deductibility is not obviously inconsistent with consumption tax
principles insofar as law enforcement is an expense of protecting physical and human capital from
damage.49 As for transportation, highways and other infrastructure are complements to both labor
and leisure: smoother roads make us more productive and also allow us easier access to beaches,
parks, malls, and movie theaters. Neither a rule of full deductibility nor a rule disallowing
deductibility would seem to be appropriate.
In sum, the claim that the SALT deduction distorts by allowing taxpayers to purchase goods
and services from subnational governments with after-federal-tax dollars overlooks the fact that
the goods and services purchased from subnational governments are very often goods and services
for which taxpayers otherwise could claim deductions under consumption tax principles.
Concededly, there is an element of consumption to expenditures on education, health care, law
enforcement, and roads, just as there is often an element of consumption to capital expenditures
more generally (and under a consumption tax, consumption expenditures should not be
deductible). At the same time, a rule disallowing deductibility would impose a higher effective tax
rate on productivity-enhancing investments channeled through subnational government than on
capital investments in the private sector. Leveling the playing field between subnational
government and the private sector is thus a very weak argument for repealing the SALT deduction.
One might ask whether this same argument would support repeal of the SALT deduction
in the event that the Republicans’ tax plan is rejected. That question generates two responses. First,
while the analysis above suggested that immediate deductibility might not be the appropriate
treatment of educational and other long-term productivity-enhancing expenditures under an
income tax, total repeal of the SALT deduction would not lead to appropriate treatment either.
Parity between subnational government and the private sector would require capitalization and
amortization of expenditures on productivity-enhancing investments with useful lives longer than
one year. The status quo of partial deductibility arguably comes closer to approximating this
capitalization-and-amortization approach than the House Republicans’ alternative of full repeal.
Second, the proposal for immediate deductibility of capital expenditures in the House
Republicans’ blueprint is arguably the last step in a decades-long march toward consumption
taxation, and we are already far down the path regardless of what happens to tax reform in the
current Congress. For most American households—whose primary investments are in their homes,
their IRAs and 401(k) plans, and their life insurance policies—the federal tax system as it affects
them comes closer to a consumption tax than an income tax. The exclusion of net imputed rent
and the $500,000 capital gains exemption for home sales lead to yield-exemption treatment for
owner-occupied real estate, which—in light of the immediate deduction-yield exemption
equivalence—conforms (more or less) to consumption tax principles. The immediate deduction
for contributions to traditional IRAs and the exclusion for contributions to 401(k) plans
approximate a tax on income minus savings, which is to say, consumption. The nontaxation of
“inside build up” in long-term life insurance policies is likewise consistent with consumption tax

49

Income tax principles would seem to support an immediate deduction for law enforcement
expenditures just as surely as consumption tax principles, as the relevant expense is recurring.
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principles, though not with income tax principles.50 Finally, the decline of dividend yields on
publicly traded stocks, the preferential tax rate on qualified dividends and capital gains, and the
basis step-up for capital assets held at death all combine to drive the effective tax rate on equity
investments down toward zero—even for stocks held in taxable accounts. The SALT deduction as
applied to educational and (arguably) health care expenditures is consistent with these other
features of the federal tax system regardless of whether the final brick in the consumption tax
edifice—capital expensing—becomes law.
2. Subnational Government vs. the Charitable Sector
The analysis in the preceding subsection compared the tax treatment of (on the one hand)
goods and services purchased through subnational government and (on the other hand) the tax
treatment of similar goods and services purchased through market institutions. There is, of course,
a third supplier of education, health care, and public goods more generally: the charitable sector.
Following state and local institutions, charities are the leading providers of elementary, secondary,
and higher education. Charities also operate more than half of all hospitals in the United States.51
The tax treatment of contributions to these charitable institutions potentially influences the debate
over the SALT deduction.
Martin Sullivan has argued that it would be “strange and unfair” to allow a deduction for
charitable contributions but not for state and local taxes.52 Oddity and equity aside, there is also a
strong efficiency argument as to why the charitable contribution deduction and the SALT
deduction should go hand in hand. Retaining the former while repealing the latter would encourage
communities to favor charitable institutions over state and local governments as providers of
education and health care even when state and local governments might be the more efficient
providers of those services. An anti-distortion rationale would seem to suggest that both should be
repealed or both should be retained.
The House Republicans’ blueprint promised to preserve the charitable contribution
deduction. According to the blueprint, “Americans are generous people who want to help their
neighbors in need,” and the tax system therefore should continue to encourage charitable giving
through a deduction.53 The Unified Framework calls for the charitable contribution deduction to
be retained as well.54 Neither House Republicans nor Trump administration officials have offered
any rationale as to why “help[ing] . . . neighbors in need” through the charitable sector should lead
to a deduction while doing the same through state and local government should not.
B. Effect on Revenue-Raising by State and Local Governments
50

See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hyrbid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 Tex. L.
Rev. 1145, 1153 (1992).
51
See Am. Hospital Ass’n, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, http://www.aha.org/research/rc/statstudies/fast-facts.shtml (last updated Jan. 2017).
52
Martin A. Sullivan, Why the SALT Deduction Is Always Under Attack, Tax Notes, Dec. 17,
2012, at 1261, 1264.
53
See Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 21.
54
See Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 5.
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Just as the SALT deduction is often attacked on the ground that it distorts decisions about
the provision of goods and services by subnational government, so too is it attacked on the ground
that it distorts the choice of revenue-raising instruments for states and localities. Again, the charge
proves unpersuasive upon closer inspection.
1. Business vs. Nonbusiness Taxes
Significantly, neither the House Republicans’ blueprint nor the Unified Framework says
anything about changing the treatment of state and local taxes paid by businesses. Repealing the
itemized deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes while retaining the deduction for taxes
paid by businesses would potentially encourage states and localities to shift from the former to the
latter.55 Consider again the case of Worker W in State X earning 100 pre-tax. Assume now that
State X imposes an income tax of 10% and that the federal government imposes an income tax of
40%. With the SALT deduction, Worker W pays 40% x (100 – 10) = 36 in federal taxes. Now
imagine that Congress repeals the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes but not for state
and local taxes paid by businesses. State X can lift the tax on Worker W and impose a new
employer-side tax of 11.11% on wages paid. Worker W’s employer can pay her 90 in wages and
pay a state tax of 11.11% x 90 = 10. After-tax results for all parties are the same as before, and all
state taxes remain deductible for federal purposes.
This observation gives rise to at least two questions. First, if states and localities can
preserve deductibility by shifting the nominal incidence of taxes to businesses, then why get so
worked up about repeal of the SALT deduction? And second, if states and localities have this
option, why don’t they exercise it already? After all, most workers cannot deduct state and local
income taxes (because they take the standard deduction), and even those taxpayers who itemize
often cannot deduct state and local income taxes in full (because of Medicare taxes and—in some
cases—the Pease provision and the AMT). The fact that we still see states and localities imposing
taxes on nonbusinesses seems to suggest that arbitrage is not as easy as the previous paragraph
makes it out to be.
With respect to the latter question, behavioral considerations may provide a partial answer.
If workers focus on pre-tax wages, then they might prefer a wage of 100 and a state income tax of
10 over a wage of 90 and an employer-side payroll tax. Alternatively (and in my view more
plausibly), states and localities may decide that administrative and other advantages of taxing
income at the individual level outweigh the federal tax benefits of taxing employers on wages paid.
Taxing income at the individual level allows for greater progressivity when some individuals have
multiple income sources. (An employer-side tax on wages paid could in theory be progressive,
with the rate rising over wages per worker; however, that would lead to a lower tax on Worker V
who earns 50 each from two employers than on Worker W who earns 100 from one employer.)
Individual-level taxation also allows states and localities to adjust tax burdens based on
characteristics such as marital status, family size, medical expenses, and so on. States and localities
may decide that the benefits of being able to tailor liabilities to individual characteristics outweigh
the federal tax considerations.
55

See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 461-69.
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The observation that employer-side taxation leads to a loss of tailored progressivity
supplies an answer to the why-get-so-worked-up question as well. If nonbusiness taxes and
business taxes were equivalent, then there would be little reason to care about the deduction for
nonbusiness taxes. But if there are meaningful differences between the two, then there arises a real
concern that repeal of the deduction for nonbusiness taxes will lead states and localities to shift to
what—in the absence of a federal tax incentive—would be their less preferred method. While
existing limits on the SALT deduction (i.e., the standard deduction, Pease, Medicare taxes, and the
AMT) already give some impetus to such a shift, total repeal of the SALT deduction would turn
the dial up.
To be sure, the status quo already distorts state and local government decisions regarding
revenue-raising to some degree. States and localities have an incentive to choose either income
taxation or sales taxation even if the optimal system would involve a mix of both. They have an
incentive to avoid selective sales taxes (such as on alcohol and tobacco) even when those taxes
might be consistent with Pigouvian prescriptions. The point here is that repealing the deduction
for nonbusiness taxes while sticking with the status quo for business taxes simply replaces one
federally induced distortion for another.
2. Now vs. Later
Any tax plan repealing the SALT deduction that becomes law during the current Congress
will almost certainly pass via the budget reconciliation process, which allows the bill to bypass the
legislative filibuster and pass the Senate with 51 votes (or 50 votes plus the Vice President as a
tiebreaker).56 Reconciliation legislation is subject to the so-called Byrd rule,57 which requires
(among other criteria) that reconciliation bills cannot add to the deficit outside the reconciliation
“window” (generally 10 years or less58). That it itself does not stand in the way of permanent repeal
of the SALT deduction because repeal would subtract from (not add to) the long-term deficit.
However, repealing the SALT deduction by a narrow majority may introduce distortions because
of the de facto temporary nature of such a measure.
If opponents of the SALT deduction build a broad-based congressional coalition that backs
repeal, then that would send a credible signal to states and localities that repeal is likely to be
permanent. Repeal by a bare majority, however, may lead states and localities to question whether
repeal will stick. If states and localities expect that the SALT deduction will be restored in the near
or medium term, then they will have a strong incentive to borrow today so as to defer tax
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See Brian Faler, GOP Plots to Return to Temporary Tax Cuts, Politico (Aug. 29, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/29/son-of-bush-gop-plots-return-to-temporary-tax-cuts242154.
57
2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(E).
58
See Sahil Kapur, Republicans Warm to Tactic for Making Deep Cuts Last Longer, Bloomberg
(June 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-15/gop-momentum-buildsto-change-rules-for-longer-lasting-tax-cuts.
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collections to a time when payments will be deductible.59 This is especially true if the tax
exemption for interest on state and local bonds remains. (The House Republicans’ blueprint and
the Unified Framework say nothing about the state and local bond exemption, and President-elect
Trump reportedly told mayors in December 2016 that the exemption would be preserved.60) And
it is especially disconcerting if state and local government debt undermines electoral accountability
and raises the risk of jurisdictional “death spirals.”61
This observation can be considered the flip side of Jason Oh’s argument that “[b]efore we
can evaluate the desirability of any piece of temporary legislation, we must first understand the
political uncertainty surrounding its renewal.”62 By the same token, before we can evaluate the
desirability of any piece of nominally permanent legislation, we must first understand the political
uncertainty surrounding its reversal. This is not to say that the SALT reduction should be retained
just because repeal might conceivably be reversed. It is to say, though, that there are real-world
costs that come with repeal by a narrow, partisan, and potentially fleeting majority.
IV. Vertical and Interstate Equity
A last set of arguments for repealing the SALT deduction focuses on equity concerns of a
different sort than the horizontal equity claims examined in Section I.B. First, proponents of repeal
argue that the SALT deduction’s benefits flow disproportionately to the very wealthy. Second,
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States may be somewhat constrained by balanced budget requirements, which bind to a
varying degree in 46 states. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES
IN THE STATES 52 tbl.9 (2015).
60
See Josh Dawsey, Mayors Startled When Trump Promises to Keep Tax-Exempt Bonds,
Politico (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/mayors-trump-tax-exemptbonds-232720.
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As Julie Roin writes:
It is economically rational for voters to elect politicians who will provide debt-financed
public benefits when they have the option of moving to another jurisdiction before that
debt falls due . . . . Such voters can have their proverbial cake—valuable public
services—and “eat it too” by foisting the costs of debt repayments onto some
combination of continuing and new residents, investors, and public employees.
Moreover, the perverse incentives provided by this exit . . . option can make it harder for
jurisdictions to return to solvency, as any financial demands placed upon remaining
residents encourages more to leave the jurisdiction, and discourages newcomers from
entering. In short, the “exit option” sets the stage for the sort of “death spiral”
experienced by cities such as Detroit, Gary, and Stockton—and perhaps soon to be seen
in Illinois and New Jersey.
Julie A. Roin, Retroactive Taxation, Unfunded Pensions, and Shadow Bankruptcies, 102 Iowa L.
Rev. 559, 562 (2017).
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Jason S. Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1055, 1056
(2015).
20

PRELIMINARY DRAFT – COMMENTS APPRECIATED
they argue that the SALT deduction forces low-tax states to subsidize high-tax states. Upon closer
scrutiny, however, the case for repeal of the SALT deduction on these grounds is quite weak.
A. Vertical Equity
High-income households pay more in state and local taxes and are more likely to itemize
deductions on their federal returns; unsurprisingly, the benefits of the SALT deduction flow largely
to wealthy. Indeed, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, households in the top percentile
of the income distribution will claim 37.1% of all SALT deduction benefits in 2017, and
households in the top decile will claim 71% of SALT deduction benefits.63
One might therefore think that repeal of the SALT deduction would reduce inequality on
an after-tax basis—i.e., it would make the bottom nine deciles better off relative to the top decile
and the top percentile. Yet that intuition is not necessarily accurate if repeal comes coupled with
rate reductions across the board. That is because the share of individual income taxes paid by
households in the top percentile and top decile is even larger than the share of SALT deduction
benefits that those groups claim: according to Treasury, households in the top percentile of the
income distribution will pay 44.9% of all individual income taxes in 2017, and households in the
top decile will pay 80.9%.64 The groups that benefit the most from the SALT deduction are also
the groups that would benefit the most from the rate reductions that repeal of the SALT deduction
could finance.
In a forthcoming article, Kyle Rozema and I estimate the distributional effects of repealing
the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenues to reduce taxes across the board. We find
that the distributional consequences are highly sensitive to the form of the accompanying tax cut.
One of the scenarios we model is as follows: the SALT deduction is repealed, all households
calculate their tax liability without the SALT deduction, and the additional revenue from SALT
repeal is rebated to households in proportion to their tax liability. We find that this revenue-neutral
repeal of the SALT deduction would increase after-tax income inequality: on the whole, the
bottom nine deciles would pay more while the top decile and top percentile would pay less.65 The
feature of the federal income tax system driving this result is the fact that high-income households
claim a disproportionate share of SALT deduction benefits but pay an even greater share of all
individual income taxes.
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U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2017 004c, Share of
Tax Benefits of Selected Individual Income Tax Expenditures by Income Class (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Selected-CreditsDeductions-and-Exclusions-2017.pdf.
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U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2017 001, Distribution
of Families, Cash Income, and Federal Taxes Under 2017 Current Law (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Distribution-ofTax-Burden-Current-Law-2017.pdf.
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See Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, Tax L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828970 (manuscript at 37 tbl.12).
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There are, to be sure, scenarios in which repeal of the SALT deduction might reduce aftertax income inequality. For example, if the additional revenue from repealing the SALT deduction
were rebated to taxpayers on a per-capita or per-household basis, then repeal would tend to make
lower-income households better off and higher-income households worse off.
The distributional ambiguity of SALT repeal is especially apparent in the current political
context. If the SALT deduction stays, then congressional Republicans and the Trump
administration will presumably need to scale back other aspects of their tax-cutting package in
order to hit their target of adding no more than $1.5 trillion to the deficit over the next decade.66 If
they respond by, say, scrapping their proposal to repeal the estate tax and adding a new surtax on
millionaires, then the distributional consequences of retaining the SALT deduction become more
progressive. If they respond by scaling back their proposed expansion of the child tax credit, then
the distributional consequences of retaining the SALT deduction look much more regressive. The
key point is that the distributional consequences of the SALT deduction depend critically on the
allocation of the additional revenue that would be generated by repeal. In the abstract, without
making assumptions about alternative revenue sources and uses, statements about the
distributional consequences of repealing the SALT deduction are virtually contentless.
B. Interstate Equity
A final argument for repealing the SALT deduction emphasizes the fact that the deduction
disproportionately benefits certain states. This observation is undeniably correct, but its normative
implications are nonobvious. Many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code affect different states
differently: the enhanced oil recovery credit benefits Texas more than Maine; 67 the credit for solar
energy aids sunny Arizona more than Washington State.68 There is almost certainly no good reason
to believe that each provision of the Internal Revenue Code should affect each state equally.
Insofar as there is any value to interstate equity on a system-wide basis, however, the
argument for repeal of the SALT deduction is shaky. Figure 1 serves to illustrate. It depicts the
relationship between SALT deductions as a percentage of adjusted gross income and federal tax
collections as a percentage of gross state product for all 50 states. The upward-sloping trend line
indicates that the states benefiting more from the SALT deduction are, on balance, also the states
that pay more in federal taxes (adjusted for economic output). The correlation is not perfect (r =
0.31), and there are a few notable outliers (e.g., New York, which ranks number one in terms of
SALT deductions as a percentage of AGI but near the middle of the pack in terms of federal tax
collections as a percentage of gross state product). The key takeaway, though, is that the SALT
deduction disproportionately benefits states that pay a disproportionate share of federal taxes.
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This target is enshrined in the budget resolution passed in October. See H. Con. Res. 71, 115th
Cong., 1st Sess. (passed Oct. 26, 2017).
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22

PRELIMINARY DRAFT – COMMENTS APPRECIATED
Figure 1. Relationship Between SALT Deduction and Overall Federal Tax Burden, by State,
2014-201569
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Again, it is worth emphasizing that the relationship in Figure 1 does not supply an
independent argument in favor of the SALT deduction. In a nation of unequal states, variation in
federal taxes as a percentage of gross state product is a feature of a progressive federal tax system,
not a bug. What it does suggest is that interstate equity, insofar as it is a value worth pursuing,
would not weigh in favor of repealing the SALT deduction.
V. Conclusion
This essay has critically examined the main arguments for repealing the SALT deduction
and has found that those arguments lack force. Far from unleashing economic growth, repealing
the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenue to cut rates across the board would likely add
69
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to the deadweight loss of the overall tax system. It would distort decisions about the provision of
public goods and services, push states toward suboptimal revenue-raising instruments, and
potentially lead to more borrowing by states and localities in the short and medium term. Equity
considerations (horizontal, vertical, and interstate) do little to enhance the case for repeal.
In comparison, the status quo of partial deductibility has much to recommend it. Partial
deductibility reflects the fact that a large chunk of state and local government spending goes toward
items—such as education and health care—that receive treatment similar to deductibility when
provided by the nonprofit and/or private sector. Partial rather than full deductibility also reflects
the fact that some state and local government spending substitutes for consumption expenditures
that would otherwise be ineligible for deduction. Perhaps a better system would be one in which
all taxpayers could deduct state and local taxes in part—as opposed to a status quo in which some
taxpayers (e.g., itemizers not subject to the AMT) come close to full deductibility, and others (e.g.,
taxpayers who claim the standard deduction) cannot deduct at all. Yet despite its imperfections,
the status quo reflects a reasonable compromise between arguments in favor of deductibility and
against.
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Appendix
The example in this appendix serves to illustrate the proposition that repeal of the SALT
deduction negatively affects the supply of labor/capital and adds to the deadweight loss of the
overall tax system. Consider two states, State X and State Y, each with identical populations and
labor markets. For arithmetic ease, assume that the marginal product of labor for all workers is
100, that workers’ pre-tax wages are equal to their marginal product, and that the labor supply
curve in each state is Q = 100(1 – t), where t is the tax rate. Thus, with no tax, Q = 100 in each
state (200 units of labor total). Deadweight loss is equal to one-half the square of the product of
the tax per unit and the change in the equilibrium quantity as a result of the tax.70 Here, where ∆Q
= 100∆t, deadweight loss is 0.5 x 100∆t x 100∆t, or 5000∆t2.
Next, imagine a federal tax on labor of 40%. Labor output in each state falls from Q = 100
to Q = 100(1 – 0.4) = 60 (120 units of labor total). Federal tax revenue from each state is 60 x 0.4
x 100 = 2400 (4800 total). Deadweight loss in each state is 5000∆t2 = 800 (1600 total).
Next, imagine that State X (but not State Y) levies an additional state tax of 10%. Assume
that state taxes are deductible from federal taxable income, so the effective federal tax rate in State
X is 36% and the combined federal-plus-state tax rate in State Y is 46%. Labor output in State X
is now Q = 100(1 – 0.46) = 54. Federal tax revenue from State X is 54 x 0.36 x 100 = 1944.
Deadweight loss in State X is 5000(0.46)2 = 1058. Federal tax revenue from State Y remains 2400,
labor output in State Y remains at 60 units; and deadweight loss in State Y remains 800. Total
federal tax revenue is now 1944 + 2400 = 4344; total labor output is now 54 + 60 = 114 units; and
total deadweight loss is now 1058 + 800 = 1858.
Now consider the effect of revenue-neutral repeal of the state tax deduction. For repeal to
be revenue neutral for the federal government, the new federal tax rate (r) must be set such that
federal tax revenue from State X + federal tax revenue from State Y = 4344. Thus:
(QX)(r)(100) + (QY)(r)(100)
-20000r2 + 19000r – 4344
r ≈ 0.3832 or r ≈ 0.5668

= 4344
=0

Assuming that the federal government chooses the lower rate of 38.32%, labor output in
State X is now approximately 51.68 units, and deadweight loss in State X is now 5000(0.4832)2 ≈
1167. Labor output in State Y is now approximately 61.68 units, and deadweight loss in State Y
is now 5000(0.3832)2 ≈ 734. Total labor output is approximately 51.68 + 61.68 ≈ 113.36 units, and
deadweight loss is approximately 1167 + 734 ≈ 1901.
Here, the same amount of federal tax revenue (4344) can be raised either (a) with a 40%
federal tax rate and a state tax deduction or (b) with a 38.32% tax rate and no state tax deduction.
Option (b) results in lower labor output than option (a) (113.36 units < 114 units, a reduction of
approximately 0.56%) and greater deadweight loss (1901 > 1858, an increase of approximately
2.31%).
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